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1.1 Introduction
Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) have now become an  integral and
enduring  aspect of the multilateral  trading regime. Between 1990  and 1997, 87 PTAs were
notified to the WTO, and nearly all signatories of the WTO are currently members of at
least one PTA.  Despite such widespread existence, concerns continue about the welfare
impacts of PTAs, especially on excluded countries.  The effects of PTAs on the volume
and quantities  of trade are studied quite frequently but, as Winters (1997a, b) argues, these
variables are not a reliable guide to welfare effects for non-member countries. The latter
are more directly related to price effects, and of these there are few studies. Indeed, there
is, to our knowledge,  no published ex  post study of the price effects of a PTA on its trading
partners.
This paper studies one of the most recently formed and controversial customs
unions, MERCOSUR (between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay).  It examines
the effect that MERCOSUR has had on the prices of its imports from non-members,
assuming that those countries export to two segmented markets, (1) Brazil and (2) rest of
the  world,  in  an  imperfectly competitive setting  with  differentiated products.  We
concentrate  on the Brazilian import market since it is a large market for imports, by far, the
largest in MERCOSUR and it provides good data over the time period of interest.!  We
'  Yeats  (1998)  first  raised  the question  of whether  MERCOSUR  may  be a concern  for non-members,  since
the most  rapidly  growing  intra-MERCOSUR  exports  appear  to be in  products  in which  members  do not  have
1postulate that changes in Brazilian m.f.n. tariff rates led directly to price changes by non-
member firms exporting to Brazil, and that tariff preferences offered to  members, e .g.
Argentina, lead to additional 'strategic' price responses within the Brazilian market.  We
seek to identify both such responses in commodity-level import data from Brazil and in
export data from its major overseas suppliers.
MERCOSUR nations have made significant tariff adjustments over our sample
period (1989-1996). In addition to unilateral reforrns over 1989-95,  they largely abolished
tariffs on imports from partners over 1991-95, as governed by the Treaty of Asunci6n,
1991. MERCOSUR's common external tariff (CET) is based on the Ouro Preto Protocol,
agreed, after much contention,  at the end of 1994  and implemented  over the following two
years. The different phasing of these adjustments, plus the exceptions to both the CET and
internal free trade-see Olarreaga  and Soloaga (1998)-mean  that the margins of preference
on internal trade show considerable  variation both through time and across commodities.
This helps us to identify their effects empirically.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 1.2 summarizes the literature on the effects
of  PTAs on  non-members and on  identifying price effects empirically.  Section 1.3
discusses some stylized facts and descriptive statistics on the major exporters to  the
Brazilian market.  The formation of MERCOSUR seems likely to have had an immediate
effect on the pricing of non-member exports to the Brazilian market.  The Treaty of
Asunci6n cut members' internal tariffs by more than 50% of the m.f.n. rate at the end of
a comparative  advantage.  Nagarajan  (1998)  argues  instead  that intra-regional  trade  should  be compared  w  ith
extra-regional  imports,  not  extra-regional  exports,  and  that  by focusing  on  the  latter,  Yeats  may  exaggerate
the effects  of MERCOSUR.  Our  work  is quite  different,  referring  to the prices  not the values  of trade  flows.
21991, with the rest of the cut to zero following over the next four years.  Intuitively, the
response to such a large discriminatory  tariff cut should be for members to increase their
pre-tariff prices, while non-members  reduce theirs.
Section 2 briefly presents a model of this process.  From this we derive reduced
form estimation  equations and a comparative  statics exercise (Appendix I) to interpret their
coefficients. The model has two firms, a 'non-member' and a 'member' firm, exporting a
differentiated product to the Brazilian market.  The two firms respond to each other's
prices (as well as to their own tariffs, exchange rates, and wages), playing a Bertrand
pricing game within the Brazilian market.  We explore the game by examining relative
member and non-member prices in Brazil, and, for certain exporters,  the relative prices of
exports to Brazil and to other markets.
Section 3 presents the empirical implementation of the reduced form equations
solved in section 2.  It also provides details of MERCOSUR's tariff policy during the
integration  period and of the data and their limitations. Section 4 examines the final results
which suggest strongly that m.fn. tariff changes and preferential tariffs both affect supplier
prices significantly,  and that MERCOSUR's preferential  tariffs caused significant  declines,
ceteris  paribus, in the prices of non-members' exports to Brazil.
1.2 Brief survey and motivation  for the study
One of the major influences on the welfare of any trading economy is its terms of
trade, and thus questions surrounding  trade policy should be concerned with this variable.
3But given its importance in theory this issue is addressed surprisingly rarely in empirical
studies.  A seminal contribution was Kreinin (1961) who considered the effects of US
m.f.n. tariff concessions during the post-war years.  Kreinin notes that a reduction in US
tariffs would most immediately affect import prices and that only through this medium
would changes in the volume of imports occur.  He also shows that US m.f.n. tariff
concessions  did indeed lead to considerable  changes in foreign  export prices. 2
By the same token the empirical analysis of the effects of PTAs should be at least
as concerned with price as with volume effects.  An elegant but relatively unremarked
theoretical examination of the terms of trade effect of regional integration is given by
Mundell (1964).  He elucidates the terms of trade effects in a 3-country model in which
goods are gross substitutes, and  in which  price changes occur to  restore balance of
payments equilibrium after an initial preferential tariff shock occurs.  He shows that for a
single tariff change by one member, the preferred exporting partner's terms of trade
unambiguously improve, while the excluded country's deteriorate.  The net effect of the
active country's tariff concessions on its own terms of trade is ambiguous, but when two
countries swap preferential concessions, as in a PTA, they collectively improve their terns
of trade vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
More recent studies focusing on PTAs such as Bagwell and Staiger (1998, 1999)
also show that the multilateral negotiations of the GATT and its principles of reciprocity
and non-discrimination  foster efficient outcomes which allow governments  to escape from
2Kreinin  states that "less than a third...of the tariff concessions granted by the US were passed on to the  IJS
consumer in the form of reduced import  prices, while more than two-thirds..  .accrued to the foreign suppliers
4a terms of trade driven Prisoners' Dilemma. The authors argue that PTA formation could
enable member countries to exploit greater market power over their terms of trade and
potentially undermine the efficient  outcome of multilateral  negotiations.
The last result is potentially very significant, for the terms of trade is by far the
most direct way in which PTAs affect the rest of the world (RoW).  Precisely paralleling
Kreinin's complaint, the usual empirical approach to assessing the effects of a PTA is to
ask whether, as a result of integration, the RoW's exports to the integrating bloc increase
(which is held to be good) or decrease (bad).  Winters (1997a) shows that this is a very
inadequate indicator: first, RoW welfare will be related to its imports not its exports, and
second, in a competitive economy, marginal changes in quantities hardly matter, whereas
changes in the prices of traded goods matter considerably. 3 Given that the theoretical
literature focuses so heavily on terms of trade effects, it is surprising that ex-post studies
which examine these variables are so very sparse.
Turning to  quantitative studies of  the effects of  integration, Winters (1997b)
observes that the RoW's terms of trade do figure in a number of ex ante studies (although
frequently with little emphasis),  but that no ex post study addresses the issue.  Winters and
Chang (forthcoming) started to do so in the case of Spanish accession to the EC, but were
severely hampered by a number of intractable data difficulties. This paper continues our
efforts in a much more satisfactory empirical environment  and generates stronger and more
and  improved  the terms  of trade  of the exporting  nations."
3 Winters  also  argues  that, contrary  to the common  belief,  Kemp  and  Wan  (1976)  said  nothing  about  whether
RoW's  welfare  increases  or decreases  in the face of a PTA. They  showed  how it could  be kept constant,
completely  obviating  the need  to discuss  its determinants.
5interesting results.  Our focus is  primarily on how regional schemes affect excluded
countries: specifically, the effect that MERCOSUR has had on the prices of imports in
Brazil since 1991.
A useful empirical literature, on which we build, relies on the micro-foundations  of
imperfectly competitive  and segmented markets. The 'pass-through' literature attempts to
explain the lack of import price changes following changes in the exchange rate, and the
consequent implication  that foreign suppliers' markups change. 4 Feenstra (1989) estimates
a markup model for the US markets for motorcycles and trucks and obtains the usefi.l
result that changes in the exchange rate and in tariffs have equal effects on the net price of
imports--the so-called 'symmetry'  hypothesis.  Feenstra, however, considered only the
rivalry between domestic and imported varieties and so examined  only the pass-through cf
the m.f.n. tariff.  For the purpose of examining PTAs, however, we have to model the
pricing  game  that  occurs  between  rival  foreign  suppliers  within  a  market  under
consideration. In imperfectly  competitive  settings, a firm's pricing depends not only on the
tariff charged on its own product, but also on that charged on its rivals'.  If a member-
country firm receives a preferential tariff concession  it becomes more competitive  in PTA
markets, and non-member firms are likely (although not bound) to reduce their prices in
compensation.  With this  in mind we move on to  present some  stylized results and
descriptive  statistics.
61.3 Stylized results and descriptive  statistics
We present three simple calculations of the mean changes in prices (unit values)
since the formation of MERCOSUR 5: for various suppliers, the average price of exports to
Brazil relative to those to non-integrating  markets (RoW); the prices of exports to Brazil
and RoW in absolute terms; and, using Brazilian data, the relative prices of imports from
members (Argentina)  and non-members. To render commodities comparable,  the starting
year price has been normalized to be  I  for each commodity so that we are essentially
measuring price changes. To be precise we estimate and plot the following  statistics:
in Figure  1:  - In  n(s  2 D,  i=(1,...,N)  and  t=(l,...,T),
N  j=,  Pl90/P2i90
in Figure 2:  IN  n  5l$i)  , i=(1,...,N)  and t=(l,...,T),
in Figure 3:  IN  ,i=(1,...,N) and t=(1,...,T).
N =1  Pl1i'90  /p,i90g
4  Several recent studies analyze incomplete pass-through in the face of  exchange rate fluctuations: for
example, theoretical papers by Baldwin (1988), Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987), and cross-sectional
industry empirics by Knetter (1989), Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Schembri (1989).
5 Because no price data are available we have to use unit value data, but since these are available at the 6-
digit level of the Harmonized System (HS-6) which distinguishes  5113 commodities,  we can have reasonable
confidence in their accuracy.  The 6-digit Harmonized System became the standard classification for trade
and tariff  data across  countries  starting  in 1989. Unfortunately,  many  countries  started  reporting  well after
that date, and there is no other way to obtain data of this level and precision for earlier years.
7Where the first subscript, I or 2, represents  prices paid in Brazil and RoW respectively,  the
second, i=l,...,N, the commodity, and the third, t=l,...,T, time, with the beginning year as
base. The bars above the prices indicate that these are pre-tariff prices, and the superscript
$ denotes prices in dollars. We have averaged prices only over the set of commodities for
which we have observations  for all years for both markets or suppliers.
Figure 1 presents mean export prices for four major exporters to Brazil and RoW:
the USA (for which 1356 commodities  were exported to both markets in all years), Japan
(580), Korea (99), and Argentina (686). The broken lines give the 95% confidence  interval
about the means.  To infer from Figure 1 an effect of MERCOSUR on prices, we have
implicitly  to employ RoW as the 'anti-monde'.  On this basis non-members' relative prices
of exports to Brazil declined  by approximately 15% between 1991  and 1996.6 Conversely,
for the integrating partner, Argentina, relative pre-tariff prices to Brazil increased.  This
latter result is not significantly different from no change, however, possibly because data
on the critical years 1991  and 1992,  during which the major shocks occured, are missing.
It is also interesting  to see the pattern of the absolute export prices in Figure 2.  For
the USA and Korea absolute export prices declined by about 10% following the shock ol-
MERCOSUR, and then began to rise somewhat afterwards.  For Japan, absolute dollar
prices to Brazil rose (presumably  reflecting  the yen's appreciation) but by less than exporn
prices in general.
6 Similar results for USA exports have been obtained using the data provided in Feenstra (1997).
8Finally, Figure 3 shows relative member/non-member  import prices in the Brazilian
market.  Argentina's pre-tariff prices rise relative to USA, Korea, and the world as an
aggregate. Japan is different presumably again explained by the appreciating Yen during
the 1990-1995  period. 7
These descriptive statistics match  our a priori  expectations surprisingly well.
Moreover, they refer to significant  volumes of international  trade.  In 1996, for example,
Brazil imports of goods amounted to $56.5 billion: $12.5 billion from the USA (22.2% of
the total), $7.1 billion from Argentina (12.6%), $5 billion from Germany (8.8%), $3.1
billion from Italy (5.4%), and  $2.9 billion from Japan (5.1%).  Other large suppliers
examined  are Korea and Chile, which account for $1.3 and $1.0 billion, (with 2.2 and 1.8%
import share) respectively. At the commodity  level the USA has a share of 10%  or more of
Brazilian imports in 60% of the HS-6 headings,  Argentina in 17%, Germany in 30%, Italy
in  16%, and Japan in  12%.  Korea and Chile each have approximately 5% of  HS-6
headings which have 10% or greater import share.
2. THE MODEL
2.1 Export Pricing under Imperfect  Competition  and Segmented  Markets
While the pricing figures above are very informative,  they are also very crude, and
so we now include a series of controls to model the effects of MERCOSUR  more formally.
7 The  Yen  appreciated  by 54%  from 144.8  in 1990  to 94.1  Yen/$  in 1995.
9We use a parsimonious model of export pricing to illustrate the effects we expect to find.
For each good we distinguish two segmented markets, Brazil and the Rest of the Worlcl
(RoW), and two exporting firms, a non-member firm from outside MERCOSUR and a
member firm from inside (always Argentina in our case). 8 The firms supply differentiatecl
products 9 and maximize profits in their own currency by manipulating duty-paid prices in
their markets (p).  They take their input costs, exchange rates and tariffs as given.  Costs
(c(x,w))  are homogeneous of degree one in the price of a composite factor, loosely
referred to here as the wage (w). Thus c (x, w) = wc(x), where x is output and c(x) is unil
costs.
The demand for the non-member's differentiated product in Brazil (market 1) is
given by, xI(p 1,p1
t,Q1,YI), a function of the its own price, p, its major rival's (Argentina)
product price, p*, the aggregate  price index, Q, and nominal national income, Y, in Brazil.
The demand for its product in the RoW (market 2) is a function of its own price, the
aggregate price level and national income in RoW, x2(p 2,Q 2,Y 2).  We are assuming here
that Argentina is a sufficiently large supplier to the Brazilian market that the non-member
firm's demand may be related to Argentina's prices, but that it is so insignificant in RoW
markets that no separate Argentina price effect will be identifiable.'  The non-member
firm's objective function and first order conditions  may thus be written:
' We concentrate  on the two largest traders of MERCOSUR,  Argentina and Brazil because data on Paraguay
and Uruguay are so sparse.
9  We use Arnington's (1969) distinction between a 'good' and 'product'.  'Goods' are distinguished only by
kind whereas 'products' are distinguished  by kind and origin of supply.
10Max  [PI  XI(PI  'PX l Ql  XY ) +  e2  P2X2 (P2,I Q2, Y2  ) - Cl (XlI)W - C2  (X2 )W(l)
P,,P2  T2
with F.O.C.s
plllw+  W  Clx(XI(P(.  PiIQQIY  D))  =0  i=-  P'  (la)
P21  +  C  W]- 2e  C2x (X2 (P2  Q22))  = °  772p =  &2  P2  (lb)
where, in addition to the variables already defined, x 1, and t 2 are the ad-valorem tariff
factors (I+t) charged by Brazil and RoW, and e, and e2, the supplier countries' currency
prices of a Brazilian REAL and RoW currency. Note that price elasticities,  ,n, and rj 2, are
affected  by the same variables as demand.
The member (Argentinian) firm's objective function and first order conditions may
be written similarly, except in that demand in RoW depends explicitly on both Argentina
and non-member  prices, with the latter being treated as exogenous.
M4ax'  elpx'X)  (2)
Max*  p;x;(p,,P  p;Q,,Y,)+  e2. P2X2-(P29P21Q21Y2)-C*(Xl`)W'  -C2(X)'  2
F.O.C.s  P;t  +  . ]-  ,  c;(x;(P 1,p;,Q,, Y)) =  0  *P.  I Pi  (2a)
10 Argentina's price is effectively rolled into the general price level in the rest of the world, captured by the
world's  price deflator Q2. The assumption is not unreasonable.  Argentina's share of Brazil's  imports
exceeds 5% in 22.6% of all HS-6 headings, but in only 3.1% of headings in RoW even using our limited set
of exporters to define world sales.
11I  *T  *6i  ; s[  iw  2 *  ___(2b)
p2[+  C 2 1 (x 2 (p 2 ,p,Q 2,YD))=O  ;  =  17
The first order conditions imply that, for any market and supplier, an increase [n
either the tariff or the supplying country's exogenous wage, or a decrease in the exchange
rate will increase the marginal cost of delivering exports.  The supplying firm must
therefore increase its marginal revenue by altering its landed price (p).  We have shown in
Appendix I, that the nature of this change depends on how the price elasticity of demand
changes as costs change.
By  assuming that the two  markets are segmented and  have independent cost
functions we are making them strategically  separable, so that we can develop two separate
pairs of price equations." In Brazil:
PI =f,(-,Pi,Q 1 ,}1)  (1a)
P. =  Y.(.l,p,zX)  (2a)
and in RoW:
P 2 = f2 (-,  Q2 ,  Y2)  (lb)
e2*
P; = A  ( W.  ,P2, Q2, Y2)  (2b)
e;
I  There is strong evidence to support that markets are in fact segmented-see  for example Knetter (1  989)
and Marston (1990).
12These equations are homogeneous  of degree one in costs, competitor's price, the aggregate
price and nominal income in local currency.  Our assumptions imply that firms play an
interactive pricing game in the Brazilian market, solving (la)  and (2a) simultaneously,
while in RoW the solution  is recursive  with (lb) affecting (2b) but not vice versa.
For estimation  purposes we log-linearize  equations  (1) and (2) and estimate reduced
form equations for prices. Thus,
. .
ln P;= A, +,BIlnWl  + 61 nW[1t+a,ln  Q, +2i,n  Yl  (3a)  '2
e,  el
. .
lnpj =A ; +  61  In w  +/,B;  In  , '+a  lnQa +  I lnh  Y1  (3b)
el  e,
lnp2 = A 2 +±82  ln-+a 2 lnQ2 +2 2 InY 2 (4a)
e2
w~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In  p; = A; + 52 In-w+,8  .I2n-,  + a* In Q2 + X21  n Y2  (4b)
Equations (4a) and (4b) are written without tariffs in the RoW, i.e., without  r2 and  T 2 ,
because these variables are considered fixed over our sample period, and thus are absorbed
into the constant term.' 3 Feenstra (1989) uses a variant of equation (3a) to show that for
US  imports of Japanese trucks and  cycles, the  long-run pass-through of tariffs and
12 In accordance with the symmetry hypothesis we have given the tariff and wage the same coefficients in
these equations,  but in our estimations  we separate  out the tariffs.
13 In fact these rates did actually change a little over time, but much less than in MERCOSUR. In any case,
since we have no data on 'world' tariffs, these variables must either be taken as constant, or absorbed into the
error term as white noise.
13exchange rates are statistically identical. Essentially, it focused on the m.f.n. effects, P of
the equation, whereas the coefficient of interest in the 'strategic' pricing relevant to PTAs
is 81*. If marginal costs are fixed then the expected sign of 81* depends only on how its
'perceived' price elasticity of demand gets altered from the preferential tariff inducedl
reduction of its rival's price. If the non-member's demand becomes more elastic, then the
optimal response is to reduce price, hence 8,* > O."4  Detailed analysis and interpretations
of the coefficients  and comparative  statics is relegated  to Appendix I.
While (3) and (4) are estimable directly it is intuitively easier and econometrically
more efficient to combine them into a series of relative price equations.  Subtracting (3a)
from (3b) generates an equation for the relative prices of member and non-member country
exports to Brazil.  Using the homogeneity assumption, i.e.,  a 1, =1-,6,  -E,  -Al,  ancl
a.  = 1-f,l  -86  - X,  we get:
ln  PL = A + (51 - WV1  wn  l  +W(V8-t5;  )  1 n  +Y(X-A  )l  (5)15
pI  e, ,  ,  ,  Q,
14 Using  the framework  of Bulow,  Geanakoplos,  and Klemperer  (1985),  we say  that  the strategic  interaction
between  these  rivals' pricing  would  be 'strategic  complements'.  This is what  one would  expect  under  price
competition.  The less  likely  outcome  is also  possible:  a reduction  in the Argentine  price  can cause  the non-
member's  demand  curve  to become  less  elastic,  at least  locally,  hence  making  it optimal  to raise  price. Thus
'strategic  substitutability'  is also  a possibility,  though  probably  rare.
15 If we were  willing  to assume  symmetry  between  (3a)  and  (3b) such  that B,  =,6;  =  ,a  =  a  ,  and  =
(5)  would  simplify  to a form expressing  relative  member/non-member  pre-tariff  prices for a product  as a
function  of relative  costs and the tariff preference  margin:  In  P' =  A  +  (8 - w/e 1 + 5 -,6)  The
bar over the price denotes pre-tariff prices.
14Figure 4, summarizes the effect of a preferential  tariff shock on the relative prices.
Panel A describes the 'normal'  effect of a preferential reduction of tariffs on a trade
partner.  The reduction shifts the  member's reaction function rf,*  to  rf 2*,  less than
proportionately if  there  is  incomplete pass through.  If  this  were  all,  and  the new
equilibrium were M, the partner price and the price relative (p*/p) would have shifted by
no more than the proportionate change in the tariff factor T*.  But, in fact, non-partner
exporters react to the price change, ultimately shifting equilibrium to N.  Here both prices
have fallen but the price ratio has fallen by less than at M, and hence certainly less than
proportionately  to the tariff shock.  In terms of equation (5) the elasticity (I3-o6*)  lies
between 0 and 1. It is also possible to have cases such as panel B, where a very responsive
member reaction  function causes the elasticity to be greater than 1, and panel C, in which a
very responsive non-member implies a negative elasticity.  We have shown that the cost
elasticities can have a wide range, but it is also clear that in all three panels the non-
member price falls. To measure this effect directly we need to isolate 8,*.
Turning to the non-members' equations (3a) and (4a) we can compare relative
export prices to Brazil and RoW. Applying homogeneity  again,
Pi  /  Q,  w~~~~  1i  [vi
ln_  -c_  811  . __  T  2n'~~2iQ  =c/ln  - 1-0f 21n[  +,5 1 In  *  +A  In1  L  In  (6) P2  /  Q2  [eQlQ  |e2QI  e1Ql ]  l]  Q2
Similarly  equations (3b) and (4b) for Argentina imply
In__Q__  *+A  w~z 1 *I  I  *,  WV  i  wi.  Y  .
P;IQ2  4  LelQ,  A  eljQe 2Q2J  1 eQ,  2  e2Q2J  QQ2  (7)
15In summary,  while equation (5) shows how much the non-member's export price changes
in Brazil relative the member's, export price, equation (6) shows how much the non--
member export price changes relative to non-member exports to RoW, and (7) how much
the member export price changes relative to its export prices to  RoW.  Our interest is
primarily on how the tariff preferences  inherent in MERCOSUR  have changed Argentinian
and non-member export prices--i.e. on the coefficients  on t,  in these equations. Figures 1
and 2 suggest that there were significant  effects through time and (5)-(7) help as to identify
whether  those are due to tariff changes  (MERCOSUR)  or to other factors such as exchange
rates or costs.
3. EMPIRICAL  IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 MERCOSUR  Tariff Policy
MERCOSUR (Mercado Comuxn  del Sur) was established under the Treaty oi
Asunci6n, signed by the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 26
March 1991 and ratified on 29 November 1991.  This treaty extended the borders of the
association between Argentina and Brazil dating from 1985 and culminating in The Treaty
of Integration,  Co-operation and Development  of November 1988.16
16 Nogues and Quintanilla (1993) note that regional integration efforts between Argentina and Brazil did not
go beyond 'declarative' statements until the Protocols initiated between 1985-1989 on capital goods which
was mainly designed  to substitute  imports from cheaper sources.
16Article 5 of the Treaty of Asunci6n defined a path of tariff liberalization to achieve
zero internal tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff barriers by the end of  1994.  The
immediate reduction of the internal applied tariff rates was by 47% of the m.fn. rate after
the ratification of the Treaty on 29 November 1991.  Subsequent preferential reductions
relative to prevailing  m.f.n. rates were to occur semi-annually  and automatically according
to the following time table: 54% December 1991, 61% June 1992, 68% December 1992,
75% June 1993, 82% December 1993, 89% June 1994, and finally 100% December 1994.'7
Members were allowed to declare upto 300 exceptions to internal free trade, but by 1995
approximately  95% of intra-regional trade was duty-free--Laird  (1997). In fact Brazil had
only 27 exceptions and so effectively had open borders for its MERCOSUR  partners.
MERCOSUR member countries had  originally planned to  align their  external
tariffs on the MERCOSUR common external tariff by  1 January 1995.  However, this
proved politically impossible and little progress was made in defining the CET until the
Protocol of Ouro Preto was signed in December 1994. Under the Ouro Preto Protocol the
CET was to be introduced  beginning 1995. Each member was again allowed an exceptions
list, the tariffs on which were to be aligned by 2001 for Argentina and Brazil, and 2006 for
Paraguay and Uruguay, see Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998).  Brazil named approximately
200 tariff lines in the  exceptions list, mainly sensitive industries such as computers,
electronics,  chemical, agroindustry,  textiles, capital goods (machinery),  and the automotive
industry.  Unilateral liberalization followed by this  negotiated changes reduced tariffs
7 Article 3, Annex 1,  Trade Liberalization  Program, Treaty of Asunci6n, 1991.
17substantially  in MERCOSUR  countries, from an average of 50% in 1988 to a CET average
of 12% in 1995.  However, it remained the case that trade policy in Brazil was subject to
vigorous debate and  to  frequent changes to  meet  short-run political objectives.  For
example, tariffs on textiles, toys and motor vehicles in particular were increased to 70% for
non-members  in 1995.18
The different phasing of internal and external tariff reductions, the large number of
tariff rates and the use of exceptions mean that over 1989-96--our sample period-tariffs
and preference margins varied widely over time and commodities. This allows us a good
chance of identifying  their effects empirically.
3.2 Data
Our trade data, used to obtain unit values from quantities and values, were taken
from the UN's Comtrade database, at the Harmonized  System (HS) 6-digit level. Although
it was introduced in  1989 several countries did not start to use HS until somewhat later.
Hence our sample  periods vary by country.
HS 6-digit data offer two major advantages over other sources. First, they are very
disaggregated--over 5,000  commodities are  distinguished.  This  helps  to  minimize
heterogeneity within each heading, which in turn improves the quality of our unit value
" Motor  vehicles  have been a special  issue  within  Brazil. The Brazilian  government  applied  special  local
content  rules. Foreign  multi-national  fiirms  which  produced  vehicles  locally  were given reduced  rates of
35%.  Japanese  and Korean auto manufacturers  in particular  claimed  that the moves put them at a
considerable  disadvantage  since,  not having  local  plants,  they  were not able  to compete  even  with  other  non-
member  suppliers.  These  types of local  content  rules  prompted  several  multi-nationals  to set up automobile
18data, and  reduces the need for tariff averaging within headings-see  next paragraph.
Second, trade and tariff data match very well at the 6-digit level, because at this level the
HS classification  is universal across countries. At finer levels of disaggregation  codes are
country-specific." 9
The tariff data were provided by UNCTAD and the MERCOSUR Secretariat-to
whom we are grateful. Over the years 1989-1994  Brazil and Argentina defined their tariff
data at HS 10-digits,  while the Common External  Tariff (CET) of 1995 and 1996, and the
exceptions listed in the agreement of Ouro Preto Protocol, are defined at the HS-8 digit
level.  In order to concord the tariff and the price data we truncated the tariff codes up to
the 6-digits and took simple averages.  This averaging within the HS-6 level is not a
serious problem  because there is very little variation in tariffs within the HS-6 digit level.
As an empirical exercise on the price effects of integration,  a study of MERCOSUR
is relatively problem-free. There are few problems of changes in quotas confounding  price
movements, since on signing of the Treaty of Asunci6n, all non-tariff barriers were to be
removed for all trade including imports from non-members. 2"  Products having NTB
measures before integration which could potentially affect prices over the series were
plants  within  the MERCOSUR  region. For details  see Latin  American  Monitor-Brazil  and  Latin  American
Regional  Report-Brazil, August  (1996).
'9  There  is a slight  discrepancy  between  the HS-6  digit codes  in HS92  and HS96. Commodities  have been
deleted  when  such  concordance  problems  arise  between  years.
20  See Laird (1997) and Frischtak,  Leipziger,  Normand  (1996). The abolition  was not entirely  clean in
practice,  however.  There  are some  instances  where  quotas  may  have  been  used,  particularly  in textiles.  Due
to heavy  losses  and high  unemployment  in the Brazilian  textile  industry  there  was great  pressure  to impose
quotas  and high  duties, especially  against  Southeast  Asian  countries. Quota  protection  and local content
rules  were  threatened  by Brazil  in  the automobile  industry  as a means  to attract  foreign  direct  investment,  but
19deleted from our sample altogether. 2'  Applied tariff rates are entirely ad valorem charged
on the c.i.f. value of imports.  There were no major prior associations between these
countries and therefore changes in tariff preferences are defined by the Treaty of Asuncian
and the Ouro Preto Protocol.  The first shock comes at the beginning of the transition
period at the very end of 1991, and the effects can be seen in  1992, and 1993.  Then
another major shock comes in 1995, when the CET is implemented  with exceptions which
tend to increase tariffs on non-members. 22
Internal tariff rates were calculated as the m.f.n. rate multiplied by (1 - average
reduction rate for that year).  Since the reductions  take place semi-annually  (see above) we
have to average them for each year to match the annual trade data. The following chart
provides a typical transition for most commodities, although we have incorporated the
exclusions  to this rule included in the agreement of Ouro Preto Protocol in December 1994,
which took  effect in  1995, as  well as the  changes that  occurred subsequent to  this
Protocol. 23
after further negotiations with Argentina they were revised and ceased to be binding--see Latin American
Monitor: Southern Cone Report, February 1996.
21 This list, obtained from UNCTAD, includes products under quantity control measures such as quotas, and
voluntary export restraints.
22  Most of the applied m.f.n. tariff rates charged to non-members including exceptions were compiled by
UNCTAD. We are grateful to Aki Kuwahara of UNCTAD and Jerzy Rosanski of the World Bank for their
help in obtaining them.  Detailed information can be obtained in United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) "A User's Manual for TRAINS", 1996.  The internal tariff rates are estimated
using these m.f.n. rates and the Treaty of Asunci6n's time path.  Brazil's detailed import and export data
disaggregated  by source country were also provided by Aki Kuwahara. Argentina's trade data, which was
used in the intermediate  stages of our research,  was provided by Tony Estevadeordal  and Raphael  Comejo of
the Inter-American  Development  Bank to whom we are also grateful.
23 This list was provided by the MERCOSUR  Secretariat.




t92  t92*(1-0.61  )
t93  t93*(1-0.75)
t94  t94Z(1e  .89)
t95  Zero
t96  Zero
As an illustration of the evolution of tariffs, we have tabulated the tariffs charged to USA
(m.f.n.) and Argentina (partner) and the preference margin in Table 1.24 These are HS 6-
digit tariffs truncated up  to 2-digits and then averaged (unweighted) across the nine
categories specified in  Appendix II.  Some notable features are  evident even at  this
aggregated  level.  First, although the m.f.n. rates are generally  falling after 1991, there are
also some increases in 1995 and 1996 as a result of Ouro Preto--in HS Chapters 16-27
(prepared foodstuffs), 41-63 (which includes textiles), 64-83 (which includes footwear,
headgear, glass etc.,) 86-89 (which includes vehicles, aircraft, vessels, transportation
equipment, etc.) and 93-96 (which includes toys). The increases in 1995 and 1996 were
within Brazil's overall binding commitments  at the WTO.
Second, while m.f.n. rates decline from  1991 to  approximately 1994 and then
stabilize or rise, the tariffs on partners continue to fall until 1995. Thus member and non-
member tariffs are not perfectly correlated, which greatly facilitates the identification of
4 This  table is confirmed  by Laird (1997), but unlike Laird,  who averages  all tariff data available,  we
provide  the average  tariffs only  for the commodities  for which  US export  price data are available  over  the
years 1991-1996,  since  these  are the tariff  rates  used  in  the estimation  for USA  export  pricing  behavior  in the
following  section.
21separate effects econometrically. Third, preference  margins did not rise monotonically as
MERCOSUR was implemented.
Finally, member and non-member wage rates or labor costs could not be obtained
at the industry level and  certainly not  at the commodity level  over the time  perioil
necessary  in this analysis. Thus in order to obtain data and also to recognize a wider range
of inputs than just  labor, we used GDP deflators to proxy export country costs (using
aggregate  export weights to Brazil to construct  non-member costs).  These variables could
easily be converted into the currency of the importer. 25 For the aggregate price index in
Brazil and RoW we employed GDP deflators.
4. RESULTS
4.1 (A) Relative Import Prices in Brazil
Our main results appear in Tables 2 through 6. As well as pooling all commodities,
these also consider 9 sub-groups of commodities.  The disaggregation allows scope for
some variability in the degrees of competition and product substitutability (differentiation)
across sectors. In every panel all variables are expressed in natural logs and as deviations
from commodity-specific  means. This is equivalent to allowing commodity-specific  fixed
effects.  We also corrected for heteroskedasticity  by collecting the residuals from the
25 The GDP deflator for the world in dollar terms was taken to be an export weighted average of the GD:P
deflators of supplying countries, with weights coming from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of
Trade Statistics:  Yearbook (1996, 1997). The representative countries included in the weighted average are:
22estimated unweighted  equations and reweighting  each of the variables by the inverse of the
estimated commodity-specific  residual standard deviations. 26 This procedure improves the
efficiency  of our estimates and permits more accurate  inference.
First we examine the prices of Brazil's imports from Argentina relative to a series
of non-member countries, equation  (5).27  To try to isolate the effects of most interest, we
have separated out the tariff effects. 28 These initial estimates appeared to suffer very
seriously from multicollinearity.  This seemed traceable to the coefficients of the real
income terms  (Y/Q), which  regularly  had  variance inflation factors above 20  and
frequently much higher.  The problem is three-fold.  First, Brazil's measured real income
was rather stable over  1989-96 so that there was little identifying power in the series.
Second, with inflation reaching 2308 % in 1994, it was unclear whether deflated nominal
income is really very informative anyway.  Third, all the explanatory data except tariffs
refer to macroeconomic  variables (the exchange rate, costs, aggregate  prices and incomes)
which are invariant over commodities.  Thus in effect we are seeking to identify three
effects with eight observations.
Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, England, Germany, Indonesia, Italy,
Korea, Mexico,  Malaysia, Netherlands,  Peru, Philippines,  Singapore,  USA, Venezuela.
26 The homoskedasticity  assumption  was tested by using the log-likelihood  ratio test and the null was always
strongly  rejected.  The procedure  adopted is a two step Feasible  Generalized  Least Squares  (FGLS)
estimation,  which is unbiased.  The coefficient estimates in the first stage regressions were quite similar to
the cross commodity heteroskedasticity  corrected set and can be obtained from the authors on request.  The
uncorrected estimations  tended to yield very low R-squares, however.
27 Brazil is used as the reporter country for the data used in Table 2A and 2B, and therefore the data run from
1989-1996, with the  exception of  Germany which Brazil only reports from  1991-1996.  The countries
represented in Table 2 make up most of the imports  to the Brazilian  market.
23We have adopted two approaches  to the multicollinearity  problem. In estimate (A)
we have assumed that 2A  =  *,V  and dropped the real income term. Strictly this implies that
for each good, the Argentinian and non-member  varieties  have the same income elasticities
of demand, but it is better thought of as merely as indicating that we have insufficient
information to  identify different elasticities.  In estimate (B) we have swept out the
macroeconomic  effects with time dummies for each year, leaving the tariff effects as the
only  explanatory variables.  Essentially relative Argentinian and  non-member prices
comprise a time-related component, which we isolate and ignore in these equations, and a
commodity-specific  component related to the two tariff rates.  With some exceptions, the
estimates of the tariff  effects--our variables of  interest--are similar between the two
approaches.
Tables 2(A) and 2(B) report the results from the overall pooled samples.  They
display a number of interesting features. First, tariffs matter for firms' pricing decisions.
Both member and non-member  tariffs are strongly statistically significant  in explaining  the
relative prices of imports within the Brazilian market. Nearly all of the overall results are
highly significant,  have the correct signs and have reasonable magnitudes according to our
discussion  above.
Second,  Brazil's  tariff  factor  on  Argentinian  imports  (T*)  affects  relative
member/non-member  prices less than proportionately  in ten out of the twelve cases.  With
the exception of Mexico and Japan, the member's tariff coefficients are less than one in
2S The results  of equation  (5) with the tariffs  combined  with  the rest of costs are shown  in the Appendix,
Table  Al.
24Table 2A and not significantly above in Table 2B.  The remaining estimates range from
0.282 for Korea to 0.884 for France, and all are statistically significantly different from
one. These latter results reflect some convex combination  of (a) Argentinian firms passing
only part of the tariff cut onto consumers (partial  pass-through) and non-members  holding
their prices constant (8o*=0),  and (b) Argentinian firms passing the tariff cut through fully
(P,*=1) and non-member firms partially following iheir prices down (0<68*<l).  We can
eliminate the extreme case of no pass-through in (a) because the tariff coefficients are all
statistically different from zero; hence we can conclude that Brazilian consumers receive
some benefit from the preferences in terms of lower prices.  It  is not clear, however,
whether--or  in what proportions--Argentinian  firms earn higher pre-tariff prices, worsening
the Brazilian terms of trade ceteris paribus, or non-member finns earn lower pre-tariff
prices, thus improving the Brazilian terms of trade.  Neither--for obvious reasons--is the
net effect on Brazilian terms of trade or economic  welfare obvious.
The case of Japan and Mexico  needs a little separate thought. The elasticities  of 1.6
and 1.4 respectively suggest that the relative Argentinian/Japanese  tariff inclusive price
changed more than proportionately to tariffs over the period of integration.  This result
seems to imply that the tariff preference had the effect of reducing Argentina's prices by
more than the tariff with respect to Japan and Mexico. We cannot rule this out as Figure 4
panel B shows.  The Argentinian reaction function may be particularly responsive in the
case of Japan because most of the products supplied by Japan are highly manufactured in
HS category 64 and above and particularly 84-85, and 86-92 where the Japanese market
share is approximately 15%.
25The R2s in Table 2A and 2B give a generally favorable view of the explanatory
power of the model.  They refer to the second-stage,  weighted, regressions,  and exceed the
first-stage unweighted ones, which are statistically significant but rarely above 0.5.  Thle
weighting process greatly devalues atypically noisy commodities with the result that fit
looks better. It is also notable that some of the R 2s differ a lot between 2A and 2B, because
the  weights  implied by  the  two  models are  very  different (they  devalue  different
commodities). If we estimate the equation from 2A using weights from a first stage of type
2B, the R2s are very close to those in Table 2B, and vice versa. 29
Tables 3A and 3B show the analogous results to  Tables 2A and 2B for major
suppliers, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, USA, and an  aggregate for the non-
MERCOSUR world, and the sub-groups of commodities defined in Appendix II.  These
estimates are not as well defined as the overall estimates  presented above, but the variables
of interest are still very significant and most often have a reasonable sign and magnitude.
Variations in the estimated coefficients are not unexpected since elasticities could vary
across commodities according to the differences in strategic interactions, which, in turn,
depend on the characteristics of demand, such as convexity and substitutability of the
differentiated  products between rival firms.
The estimates seem most robust across countries for the commodities in group 16-
27 processed foods, 64-83 manufactures  products and 84-85 engineering products. Again
we  see that  the  tariff coefficients are reasonably similar between the two  different
29 Available from the authors upon request.
26specifications (Table 3A and 3B).  The incomplete pass-through is most  consistently
evident in the engineering products 84-85, which seems, perhaps, the most likely place for
it to occur.  It is also the sub-aggregate with the largest sample of observations, which
increases our faith in the estimates.  The coefficients are all significantly greater than 0
(except Great Britain) and less than 1.  At the other extreme, a notable concern is the
results for commodities 41-63, which include textiles and leathers.  These generally have
counterintuitive  signs and magnitudes,  possibly due to the fact that, over the sample period,
these commodities had many changes in industrial and trade policy other than tariffs-
possibly including unofficial quotas on textiles.  Among the primary products, 01-15, the
only significant results are for the USA, the biggest competitor of Argentina.  The others
are not statistically  distinguishable  from either 0 or 1.
Overall, given the simplicity of the model, the noisy data and the small samples for
some sub-aggregates,  the results in Tables 3A and 3B suggest a reasonable level of support
for the view that preferential tariff concessions affect firms'  pricing decisions, raising
prices for the preferred suppliers and/or lowering  those of non-preferred  ones.
4.2 (B) Relative Export Prices
Although the previous section identified changes in the relative prices of imports
from member and non-member sources, it could not determine  which prices moved. Thus
it was not clear whether--and in what proportions--Argentinian  firms gained and non-
member firms lost from MERCOSUR.  We now turn to export data to try to make this
determination.
27For each of several non-member  exporters  we explore changes in the relative prices
of their exports to  Brazil and to  the rest  of the world (RoW) as the former offered
preferences to Argentina.  Essentially, appealing to the complete segmentation of export
markets, we are using export prices to the rest of the world as the anti-monde for those to
Brazil.  Equation (6) above is the estimating equation and the results are reported in TabLe
4A (equation 6 per se) and 4B (with time dummies). 30
The results in Table 4A are quite intuitive. An increase in the exporter's costs (wv)
has hardly any effect on the relative prices of exports to Brazil and the RoW--both sets o,)f
prices rise roughly equally.  (This is 1-r 2).  Changes in the prevailing prices in one or
other of the markets (Q, or Q 2) get reflected, ceteris paribus, nearly one-for-one in the
price of exports relative to prevailing prices--i.e. export prices do not change very much.
Changes in the exchange rate between the exporter's and one importer's currency (e, or e ),
on the other hand, do get reflected--again almost proportionately--in the price relatives.
Changes in Argentina's costs--which impinge on the dependent variable via their effect on
Argentina's export prices to Brazil and hence on other exporters' prices in that market--
have negligible effects. These results seem a little extreme, but given that they are not our
focus of interest, not alarningly so.
30  It is important  to note that we are now using export data reported by the exporter in question. These data
are broadly similar  to the data on Brazil's imports, except, (a) we have exports by these countries to the non-
MERCOSUR  market as the counterfactual or control group and (b) the sample is restricted to the sub-set of
countries that report HS-6 data for sufficient years to allow estimation.  In  estimating the results which
follow we use only commodity headings  that are supplied to Brazil by both the non-member and Argentina.
Although this raises the question of whether those product varieties exported by non-members but not by
Argentina have also been effected by potential entrants within that product category that is a different issue
which will not be examined  here.
28Turning to the tariff effects, the results are strong and consistent.  In two cases
Chile and Japan, exporters seem to pass the full effect of tariffs on their goods through to
purchasers, while for the other three pass-through ranges from small to substantial. At the
extreme, a change in the tariff on Korean suppliers seems to affect its export prices less
than proportionately: tariff inclusive prices rise by approximately  one-fifth to one-third of
the increase in the tariff, resulting in a substantial loss in revenue for these suppliers.
Korea is a much smaller supplier than Japan or the USA, and exports mainly textiles 41-63,
manufactures 84-85  and  auto parts  86-93.  Other  suppliers seem  less  affected by
multilateral tariff changes. Overall the degree of pass-through observed here is similar to
that from the exercise on Brazilian import prices, but, except for the USA, the largest
supplier and with the largest sample of commodities,  the correspondence  is not particularly
good  at the country level.  This  is not particularly surprising, however, for the two
exercises rely on completely different data for prices and it is well known that the two
countries involved in the bilateral trade flow frequently report it quite differently.
Even more interesting are the estimates of the effects of  the tariffs levied on
Argentinian exports to Brazil.  These also appear to matter in non-member pricing in the
Brazilian market.  In Table 4A, ceteris paribus around one third of any tariff changes
facing Argentinian exports is reflected in their rivals' pre-tariff (and post-tariff) export
prices.  It  is also  interesting to  note that  Japan shows the smallest effect from the
Argentinian tariff coefficient, confirming to some degree that panel B of Figure 4 may be
the correct representation  of the Japan-Argentina  price competition.
29The corresponding  results in Table 4B, in which we have swept out all the macro
effects, suggest rather larger effects from Argentinian  tariffs, although again, the results for
the USA are perfectly  robust across the two specifications. Including  the fixed time effecas
neutralizes the effects on the estimates of the variation through time in the mean tariff on
Argentinian exporters. Thus the tendency for the estimates  of the 'cross-tariff effects to be
higher in Table 4B suggests that the macro-economic  consequences of MERCOSUR or
some other aspect of macro-economic  evolution over 1991-96  allowed exporters to off-set
some of the direct  'strategic'  price reductions that preferences would otherwise have
induced in individual markets.  For example, this result might reflect the optimism arid
growth that accompanied  MERCOSUR  and the Real Plan and their investment effects.
There is  no reason  to  believe that  exporters' prices to  RoW  are responding
materially to Brazil's tariffs against Argentina, so we take Table 4 as strong confirmation
that preferential tariff reductions in MERCOSUR forced down the pre-tariff export prices
of non-members,  turning, ceteris  paribus, the terms of trade against the latter.
As we did previously in the importer analysis, we have also disaggregated these
results into 9 sub-groups. Most cases in Table 5A and SB show that the coefficient of the
own tariff is positive, but, not surprisingly,  the range is large in some cases.  If we ignore
estimates with fewer than 100 error degrees of freedom (EDF), we are left with all positive
elasticities  except one, of negative 0.710 for Korea in the sub-group  41-63. Overall, three-
quarters of the estimates of the 'own tariff  effects are below one and one quarter of them
are significantly  less than one statistically  with 95% confidence.
30The coefficients  on the rival (members') tariffs are also significant. They tend to be
positive and significant in manufacturing  sectors such as chemical products 28-38, textiles
41-63, engineering  products 84-85 and vehicles 86-92. Processed foods 16-27 and textiles
41-63 show largest effects, while the least affected by integration are the primary sectors
01-15, which are the most homogeneous products, and the miscellaneous group 93-96,
which includes things such as works of art, and arms and ammunition which are not
substitutable in general.  Table 5B broadly confirms the results on the tariff variables,
although,  again, the rival's tariff effects  tend to be larger.
Although we  are sometimes struggling to  separate the  various effects in  this
exercise, these results strongly suggest that preferential tariff reductions force cuts in the
export prices of countries excluded from regional arrangements. A second exercise on
exporter data considers Argentina's relative export prices. This is the estimation equation
(7) which is reported in Table 6A and 6B. Unfortunately, the most crucial years for
identifying tariff cuts,  1991 and  1992, can not be included because Argentina started
reporting HS data only in 1993; hence the results in this section are very tentative.  In
particular, because tariffs on Argentina  were almost insignificant  from 1993 on, we have to
combine this  variable with  the  other costs.  The effect  of  non-members' tariffs on
Argentina's export prices is clearly significant  for the overall sample at 0.245, but the own
cost effect is small and insignificant. The disaggregated  results and those from Table 6B
are even less informative.  Thus all we can confidently conclude from the exercise on
Argentinian data is that they are not inconsistent  with our basic hypothesis.
315. CONCLUSION
This paper is intended primarily as an exercise of positive economics, but it is
interesting to ask whether the effects uncovered  are significant in welfare terms. The fir;t-
order estimate of the welfare effect of a price change is q*Ap. Assuming that all variables
except tariff rates were uneffected by MERCOSUR  and taking unweighted  averages of the
latter we can use the coefficients  of Table 4A to make such estimates. The USA exported
$5.4 billion to Brazil in 1991. With partner tariffs falling by an average of 26 percentage
points by 1996 and a coefficient of 0.445, this implies a loss of $624.1 million, in that year.
Similar losses occurred for the other countries which reported export data-see  Table 7,
column 4A:  Japan (with losses of $58.8 mil.), Germany ($236 mil.), Korea ($13.7 mil.),
and Chile ($17.3 mil.).  These estimates are very crude-for  example not all US exports
may have been affected, and there may have been partly off-setting changes in quantities-
but they are indicative of the magnitudes of losses in export revenue that countries left out
of regional arrangements may suffer.  Column 5A of Table 7 repeats the exercise using
disaggregated  tariffs and estimates from Table 5A.  The estimates are quite similar when
summed over the whole set of goods.
Some have argued that the m.f.n. reductions which accompanied MERCOSUR
were  also a  part of  the  MERCOSUR program-see  Cadot, de  Melo  and  Olarreaga
(forthcoming) for  a  discussion-and  that  these  should  be  included  in  the  pricing
calculation.  Columns 4A*  and  5A*  present  analogous results  which  additionally
incorporate the terms of trade gains that non-members may have earned as m.f.n. tariffs
32fell. The 'pass-through' of m.fn. tariff changes  to consumers  is quite large (close to one in
the aggregate, except for Korea) and the changes in tariffs are much smaller for non-
members than for members, however, so that the gains from the m.f.n. reductions are not
large, and do not off-set the effects of the preference.
We have shown empirically that  regional integration does affect traded goods
prices, and that it matters significantly for non-member exporters supplying an integrating
market. Even if a PTA aims only to "facilitate  trade between the constituent  territories and
not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting  parties with such territories" (GATT,
Article XXIV),3" and indeed, even if, as with MERCOSUR,  it simultaneously  undertakes a
general trade liberalization, other contracting parties may still be  affected adversely,
because they are compelled to  reduce their prices to meet competition from suppliers
within the PTA.  Given their excellent data, we have studied this phenomenon in the two
major MERCOSUR members, but  it seems just  as likely to pertain to  other regional
groups. Of course, this is only one part of the overall welfare calculus for non-members.
One needs also to consider the prices of their imports from the bloc and any volume effects
on trade, which could tip the balance and generate overall gains.  Nontheless, the effects
identified  here are large enough to warrant serious  consideration.
31 There  is a similar  clause  in  the Differential  and  More  Favourable  Treatment,  Reciprocity  and Fuller
Participation  of Developing  Countries,  Decision  of 28 November  1979  (L/4903).
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36Appendix  I  Comparative  Statics
The Appendix explores the meaning behind the coefficients in the reduced forms
presented  in the set of equations (3) and (4).
The  comparative  statics  for  the  Brazilian  market  are  obtained  by  totally
differentiating the  first  order  conditions (la)  and  (2a).  Writing  z  for  (wT/e) and
correspondingly  for z*, and dropping  the market subscripts  we obtain,
[op  - P  ]P + [  m.P*  +[  - _  ]Y +  [OQ  _  -Q  ]Q  = 0  (8a)
[0;  P  YjP[9  P  Y  7*17p  ]P*  +[o  Y  -7r]Y7Q+[O  Y7QQ  =0  (8b)
where
'in  p'  i
=  - ,  n.  p=-,
'  m  x
Y  a  Y
oY m  17Y d'Y  x
37and where the member variables have stars superscripted  and non-member  variables none.
Solving the two equations simultaneously  will define the equilibrium reactions of
the firms to changes in the exogenous variables that we have defined, i.e., z, Y, and Q.
This system of equations are put in matrix form and solved for the equilibrium conditions
we are concerned with.
C  -r  i  -- 7P*jPj  2(Oy-yr7)Y-hQ  [1  0  -(Oy-y7y)  -h  i
O;p-r'7p 9P-r'17  P?7  - i-(oQ-y'7iQ)Y-h' Lo  1  -(6*y-yi7?y)  -h j
(PD)  1  (0-.Y*77p.)  -(rp.-p.  )]l  0  -(yMyy)  -h  -|)  (9)
A  -(O-  ,  r'p)  (Op  -rrp)  0  1  -(9-y  y  qy)  -h  'Y
where
h =  1- (Op  - y7p  ) - (Op  MP.  )(y  - yiy ),  similarly for  h*, since equations (8a) and
(8b) above are homogeneous  of degree one. Also,
A = (Op  - Y7p  )(O>  r  77)-(p  M-P.)(p -YqUp  )-
Two reduced form pricing equations for the non-member and member firms which
are also homogeneous  of degree one in the costs, general price and income, are shown here
as equations (10), and are analogous  to (3a) and (3b).
38pi  =I.-2,I+6 i2  +,  .y  +a,  *Q,  (lOa)
s*' - *5 ')
(  ~A)
,  ~(09Y  -Y*'7y)(9p*r p7)-( 9 -Y)(9;  -Y*"
a 1 ]  = 1-J-  81  ;-  21
=  ±  2,+B;2;  +2;*+a;.Q,  (lOb)
AA ,L((P-r  v7p)(O  -my) -(Op  -r l7p)(0- 
1 = 1 - a} -fi 1 -i;
39To  simplify these unwieldy elasticities, assume that the marginal costs of both
member and non-member firms are fixed, y, y*=O.  Then the elasticities can be neatly
defined as:
TPT0  9. O-  9;  '  0  .OjZ
P  ppPp  p  p
Assuming the denominator  is positive, the signs of these elasticities  depend on the signs of
the elasticity of an exporter's 'marginal revenue' with respect to its own price, and its
rival's price.  The denominator being positive merely implies that  "own"  effects cn
marginal revenue are greater than that of the "cross" effects.  The elasticity of marginal
revenue  with respect to own price is,
op = dnP=,-  p2I97)  l  A(  p)
p  4  m  z7  t  a7  tl+J  11p
Its sign only depends on the sensitivity of the own price elasticity to changes in its own
price:
-V  p  --  ~2  - __ (  P)=  PP  +  P - 2XP  = PPP  +  P (1-  P  )  =  PP + xP (I1-U7p),
which is negative given that demand is not too convex.  For instance, given a  linear
demand curve, raising the price would reduce the price elasticity of  demand (higher
absolute number, i.e., more elastic). This implies that P > 0, but it is also notable that it is
40possible to have  3 1> 1 when firms behave in a strategic  manner even when you have the
normal case, (7p/,)  < O  .32
The sign of the elasticity of 'marginal revenue' with respect to its rival's price
(op. ) is essential in determining strategic  effects on prices.
in  p*  pp'  *p  (  O1  O  ldp.  p
p  0  m  l  7Pm  O4,)  1+lp)  '4, li7p
where the sign is only dependent on the sensitivity of the own price elasticity to a change
in the rival's price,
(*pA  I(  dx  a)1 
t p)  x  x@s-U  . =-x  .- Qx.
T'he slope of the 'perceived' price elasticity of demand with respect to the rival's price is
positive if the products involved are substitutes,  xp.  > 0, and the magnitude of xpp.  is small.
The strategic effect, 8,*,  is then also positive. 33 Symmetric results will be found for its
rival's variables.
3  This is a distinction  from Feenstra  (1989),  since  in his outcome  the 'normal' case is such  that the pass-
through  (,B)  is between  0 and 1.
"  This result can be expressed  more elegantly  by using the framework  of Bulow, Geanakoplos,  and
Klemperer  (1985)  and recognizing  that  price  competition  in a Bertrand  model  is usually  considered  'strategic
complements', i.e.,  d' r  >O  by  definition.  Differentiating  equation (1)  by  p,  and  obtaining
e, l H(Pl  XP;-) =oX where H(p,  p`,...)=  p(  +  Il_ iC  wT1 as in (la), it is then apparent  that
ri 14;1  ~  where  OX,  e,
the  cross derivative is:  d2 n1  el a  H.(pH,p')+el  d2x,  H(p,,p,)>O  and so  HP.(p,,p0)<O
d0dp  r, op,  (pi PI  °P
(equivalent  to Op.  in the text above) since  the second  term is 0 when frms are optimizing  profits and
therefore  8,*'  > 0. 'Strategic  substitutes'  would  imply  the opposite  sign.
41Let's consider a shift in the member's tariffs, hence a change in the member's price
(p*).  Since we have assumed that marginal costs are fixed, a  shock that shifts this
exogenous  marginal costs such as a tariff change, will alter its marginal revenue. A decline
in the member's tariffs will reduce the landed price, p*, of the member country's product,
The non-member will alter his price depending on the effect it has on its marginal revenue.
We first begin with the case that is more likely.  If a reduction in the price causes the non-
member's  demand  to become  more  elastic,  (or,p  /lc) > 0, then the optimal  response  is tc
reduce price (p), where the elasticity is defined here so that it is negative and that more
elastic implies that  lp is a larger negative number.  On the other hand, the less likely
outcome which is also possible is that if the reduction in p*  causes the non-member's
demand to become less elastic, i.e., (977p/@ ) < 0, then it is optimal for this firm to raise
its price (p).  Both signs are theoretically possible when we are concerned with the price
effect due to shifts in the rival's costs.
42Appendix  II:  HS-2  Sub-Group Description
01-15  Live Animals, Animal Products,Vegetable  Products,
Animal or Animal Fats and Oils
16-27  Prepared  Foodstuffs, Beverages,  Tobacco and Tobacco Substitutes
Mineral  Products
28-38  Products of Chemicals and Allied Industries,
Organic and Inorganic Chemicals
Fertilizers,  Pharmaceuticals,  Perfumery
Photographic and Cinematographic  Goods
39-40  Rubber and Plastics
41-63  Raw Hides and Skins,  Leather, Furskins, Travel Goods, Handbags
Wood and Articles of Wood, Manufactures  of Straw
Textiles and Articles of Textiles
64-83  Footwear, Headgear,  Umbrellas, Walking Sticks, Articles  of Human Hair
Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Mica or similar Materials,Ceramics,
Glass and Glassware
Natural or Cultured  Pearls, Precious Stones, Precious Metals, Jewelry
Base Metals, Articles of Base Metals,  Iron,Steel,  Aluminum,  Zinc, Lead, Tin, Copper,  Nickel
84-85  Machinery  and Mechanical  Appliances, Electrical Equipment  and Parts
Sound  Recorders and Reproducers
Nuclear  Reactors, Television  Image and Sound Recorders
86-92  Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels  and Associated Transport  Equipment
Optical,  Photographic, Cinematographic,  Measuring, Precision Medical  Instruments
Clocks, Watches, Musical Instruments,
93-96  Arms and Ammunition
Miscellaneous  Manufactured  Articles, Furnitures,  Bedding, Mattresses
Works  of Art
43Figure 1: Average relative price to Brazil, and the rest of the world.
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44Figure  2: Average absolute export prices to Brazil and to the non-MERCOSUR  world.
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45Figure  3: Average relative price of Argentina/rest  of the world (RoW), in the Brazilian  market.
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46Figure 4: The effect of a PTA on member and non-member prices.
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47Table  1: HS-6 tariff average  (unweighted)  for non-member,  member
and preference  margin by sub-group  and by year.
HS-2^  YEAR  M.F.N. PARTNER  PREF.  MARGIN4
01-15  1991  16.7  16.7  0.00
(55)'  1992  11.5  4.5  6.56
1993  8.3  2.1  6.08
1994  7.4  0.8  6.55
1995  7.6  0.0  7.63
1996  7.8  0.0  7.78
16-27  1991  28.7  28.7  0.00
(61)'  1992  22.5  8.8  11.86
1993  9.3  2.3  6.68
1994  8.3  0.9  7.30
1995  11.2  0.0  11.17
1996  11.5  0.0  11.53
28-38  1991  19.2  19.2  0.00
(340)'  1992  15.3  6.0  8.62
1993  11.8  3.0  8.55
1994  7.4  0.8  6.54
1995  8.0  0.0  8.00
1996  8.0  0.0  8.04
39-40  1991  26.4  26.4  0.00
(107)-  1992  22.4  8.7  12.40
1993  13.8  3.5  9.97
1994  12.2  1.3  10.69
1995  12.2  0.0  12.20
1996  12.1  0.0  12.05
41-63  1991  26.4  26.4  0.00
(141)^  1992  20.6  8.0  11.37
1993  14.4  3.6  10.39
1994  13.1  1.4  11.50
1995  14.9  0.0  14.95
1996  14.2  0.0  14.17
64-83  1991  18.9  18.9  0.00
(150)'  1992  15.9  6.2  8.99
1993  11.4  2.9  8.24
1994  10.4  1.1  9.08
1995  12.2  0.0  12.21
1996  12.7  0.0  12.66
84-85  1991  30.8  30.8  0.00
(363)'  1992  26.1  10.2  14.33
1993  19.5  4.9  13.88
1994  19.3  2.1  16.76
1995  17.0  0.0  17.04
1996  17.2  0.0  17.17
86-92  1991  36.6  36.6  0.00
(110)*  1992  29.7  11.6  15.94
1993  20.9  5.2  14.80
1994  20.5  2.3  17.78
1995  16.4  0.0  16.42
1996  22.2  0.0  22.17
93-96  1991  48.3  48.3  0.00
(29)-  1992  40.6  15.8  20.98
1993  20.0  5.0  14.24
1994  17.8  2.0  15.50
1995  18.2  0.0  18.21
1996  19.9  0.0  19.93
l he parenthesis  under the sub-group  headmg  is the number  of commodities  available.
* The preference  margin is calculated  at the commodity  level using  {[(l+tmfn)/(l+tpartner)l-l  l  100.
48Table 2A: Estimation  results of equation  (5) over  all  commodities.**
COUNTRY  T  SE  I*  SE  w/e ,Q, SE  w*/e ,*Q , SE  R 2 EDF
CANADA  4.692  0.133  0.478 0.093  0.490 0.037  -0.239 0.039  0.399 1178
CHILE  -0.242  0.096  0.601 0.065  -0.060 0.041  0,300  0.023  0.232 1138
CHINA  -0.739 0.041  0.470 0.039  -0.344 0.022  0.631  0.038  0.403 1029
FRANCE  -1.136 0.201  0.884 0.141  0.226 0.097  -0.147  0.064  0.032 2278
UK  -0.680 0.152  0.417 0.093  0.245 0.041  0.084  0.033  0.075 2800
GERMANY.  -0.570 0.111  0.338 0.063  -0.104 0.022  0.318  0.028  0.091 4076
ITALY  -0.465 0.120  0.754 0.076  -0.151 0.020  0.361  0.027  0.058 3901
JAPAN  -0.690 0.095  1.636 0.059  0.041 0.003  0.183  0.010  0.873 2836
KOREA  -1.200 0.120  0.282 0.073  1.024 0.102  -0.299 0.065  0.299 1276
MEXICO  -0.648 0.163  1.429 0.116  0.225 0.034  0.393  0.042  0.741  943
USA  -0.822 0.129  0.636 0.094  -0.052 0.044  0.066  0.035  0.012 4699
WORLD  -0.915 0.038  0.332 0.026  -0.019 0.012  -0.032  0.011  0.092 9049
Table  2B:  Estimation  results  of equation  (5) over  aUl  commodities  with  year  time  dummies.**
COUNTRY  X  SE  r*  SE  R 2 EDF
CANADA  0.968 0.226  1.195 0.149  0.195 1172
CHILE  -0.876 0.213  1.073 0.139  0.275 1132
CHINA  0.482 0.116  0.087 0.140  0.203 1023
FRANCE  -0.948 0.234  0.894 0.185  0.091 2272
UK  -1.090 0.227  0.916 0.160  0.055 2794
GERMANY,  -0.076 0.159  0.110 0.105  0.070 4072
ITALY  -0.886 0.161  0.768 0.116  0.102 3895
JAPAN  -0.776 0.178  1.455 0.128  0.198 2830
KOREA  -0.765 0.169  0.525 0.118  0.051 1270
MEXICO  -0.389 0.199  1.288 0.149  0.270 937
USA  -0.446 0.110  0.329 0.093  0.025 4693
WORLD  -0.558 0.079  0.092 0.057  0.031 9043
**  Estimates  are in bold  and standard  errors  SE are  beside  the estirnates;  Data  used is reported  by Brazil  therefore  unit values  are reported  as c.i.f.;  all
variables  represented  above  are in natural  logs. The  'WORLD'  represents  the non-MERCOSUR  world  as an aggregate.
.b Germany's  data  period  runs from 1991-1996.  All others 1989-1996.
49Table  3A: Estimation  results for equation (5), by 9 commodity groups.**
HS-2  COUNTRY  *  SE  e  SE  wle,Q1 SE  w/le,*Q1 SE  R2  EDF
01-15  fra  -0.816  0.995  0.506  0.616  -0.274  0.250  -0.2i6  0.203  0.106  134
gbr  -0.782  1.458  1.845  0.939  -0.585  0.265  0.682  0.227  0.137  84
ger4  -1.4i0  0.640  0.489  0.358  -0.789  0.127  0.851  0.137  0.290  162
ita  -0.098  1.341  0.255  1.054  -0.433  0.035  0.775  0.167  0.605  100
usa  -1.613  0.412  0.948  0.314  0.084  0.114  0.289  0.089  0.141  328
wid  0.078  0.328  -0.007  0.256  0.222  0.059  0.053  0.054  0.209  931
16-27  fra  -2.835  0.661  1.952  0.488  0.905  0.425  -0.696  0.283  0.169  136
gbr  -2.635  0.551  0.647  0.445  1.289  0.271  -0.867  0.267  0.223  140
ger.  0.547  0.195  -0.055  0.269  -1.983  0.460  1.695  0.332  0.219  187
ita  -1.167  0.391  0.515  0.269  0.196  0.160  -0.099  0.150  0.035  253
usa  -1.131  0.525  0.111  0.372  0.022  0.190  -0.026  0.166  0.066  289
wid  -2.339  0.206  1.371  0.177  0.079  0.076  0.157  0.072  0.567  634
28-38  fra  -1.605  0.461  1.024  0.368  0.403  0.219  -0.281  0.159  0.031  552
gbr  -0.283  0.460  -0.235  0.367  0.339  0.120  -0.359  0.122  0.014  677
ger&  -0.750  0.099  0.338  0.158  0.296  0.050  0.381  0.042  0.990  922
Ita  0.697  0.369  -0.983  0.252  0.494  0.067  -0.480  0.077  0.126  526
usa  0.043  0.259  0.347  0.162  0.099  0.086  0.160  0.068  0.123  905
wvd  -0.834  0.203  0.362  0.174  0.290  0.023  -0.102  0.024  0.718  1394
39-40  fra  0.304  0.814  -0.692  0.519  0.527  0.377  -0.147  0.253  0.017  284
gbr  -0.762  0.806  -0.112  0.578  0.840  0.281  -0.077  0.240  0.088  333
ger  -2.036  0.680  0.826  0.462  0.075  0.490  0.645  0.402  0.087  408
Ita  -1.142  0.727  1.902  0.491  -0.500  0.179  0.843  0.176  0.068  400
usa  -1.363  0.626  0.519  0.382  0.250  0.203  0.038  0.156  0.023  497
wid  -1.420  0.448  0.844  0.300  0.039  0.147  0.154  0.109  0.026  643
41-63  fra  2.431  0.893  -1.935  0.679  0.696  0.365  0.129  0.245  0.101  164
gbr  2.487  1.159  -0.470  0.847  -0.282  0.205  0.460  0.177  0.044  247
gera.  2.914  0.789  -3.729  0.468  -0.853  0.312  1.U60  0.274  0.849  338
ita  0.574  0.629  1.543  0.445  -1.052  0.112  1.576  0.113  0.488  429
usa  -0.901  0.740  0.674  0.514  -0.225  0.150  0.338  0.125  0.028  521
wid  0.512  0.316  -0.987  0.212  -0.179  0.069  0.077  0.061  0.096  1378
64-83  fra  -2.468  0.786  2.099  0.440  0.138  0.388  -0.104  0.241  0.102  269
gbr  -2.765  0.772  1.973  0.530  -0.360  0.237  0.631  0.211  0.088  361
ger4  -1.996  0.516  1.208  0.168  -0.686  0.257  0.333  0.190  0.194  657
ita  -3.090  0.084  1.013  0.164  0.622  0.102  -0.495  0.062  0.754  547
usa  -2.222  0.203  0.516  0.286  0.076  0.142  -0.443  0.130  0.185  621
wld  -2.326  0.348  1.549  0.223  -0.594  0.097  -0.043  0.087  0.950  1337
84-85  fra  -0.154  0.697  0.868  0.369  0.041  0.285  -0.072  0.180  0.059  560
gbr  0.071  0.589  0.435  0.435  0.474  0.248  -0.238  0.194  0.066  729
ger4.  -0.323  0.309  0.673  0.105  -1.268  0.149  1.235  0.108  0.459  1076
ita  -0.060  0.374  0.814  0.252  -0.160  0.106  0.118  0.096  0.046  1219
usa  -0.571  0.346  0.865  0.196  -0.198  0.097  -0.003  0.070  0.041  1135
wid  0.104  0.199  0.089  0.115  -0.182  0.074  0.092  0.052  0.004  1942
86-92  fra  0.522  0.532  1.032  0.539  -1.081  0.599  0.183  0.408  0.111  104
gbr  -0.739  0.386  -0.014  0.406  0.180  0.382  0.043  0.294  0.033  152
ger4  -0.843  0.134  -0.759  0.076  8.097  0.275  -7.755  0.243  0.969  204
Ita  -1.451  0.286  2.219  0.358  -1.016  0.155  1.458  0.121  0.466  260
usa  -0.013  0.299  0.811  0.241  -0.803  0.228  0.481  0.167  0.071  224
wid  -0.578  0.173  0.368  0.189  -0.543  0.158  0.259  0.108  0.076  452
93-96  fra  -4.027  2.126  2.647  1.585  0.361  1.238  0.556  0.775  0.097  43
gbr  -0.282  1.405  -0.690  1.167  0.186  1.088  1.818  0.830  0.320  45
ger4  2.085  0.612  -0.722  0.717  -1.221  1.105  1.355  0.834  0.176  90
ita  0.530  0.680  1.501  0.641  -0.264  0.051  -0.614  0.122  0.416  145
usa  -0.966  0.515  0.503  0.429  -0.344  0.477  0.436  0.438  0.037  147
wid  -0.470  0.416  -1.235  0.305  0.219  0.265  -0.744  0.214  0.690  306
"*Estimates  are  in  bold  and  standard  errors  are  beside  the  estimates;  all variables  are  in  natural  logs.  Countries  represented  are
France (fra),  Great  Britain  (gbr),  Germany  (ger),  Italy  (ita),  USA  (usa),  and  the  non-MERCOSUR  world  as  an  aggregate  (wid).
46Germany's  data  period  runs  from  1991-96.  All  others  are  from  1989-1996.
50Table  3B: Estimation  with  Time Dummies  by 9 commodity  groups.**
HS-2  COUNTRY  T  SE  E  SE  R
2 EDF
01-1S  fra  -1.277  1.002  0.537  0.639  0.135  128
gbr  -2.316  1.677  2.166  1.057  0.189  78
ger*  -1.866  0.581  0.504  0.378  0.199  158
ita  0.000  1.931  0.075  1.525  0.162  94
usa  -1.372  0.478  0.840  0.367  0.242  322
wld  0.087  0.379  0.001  0.301  0.032  925
16-27  fra  -0.831  1.399  0.943  1.070  0.265  130
gbr  -2.762  0.510  2.008  0.459  0.315  134
ger4  1.326  0.473  -0.377  0.507  0.105  183
ita  -0.198  0.451  0.173  0.325  0.128  247
usa  0.139  0.743  -0.686  0.529  0.097  283
wvd  -1.721  0.439  1.052  0.321  0.074  628
28-38  fra  -0.841  0.560  0.698  0.508  0.122  546
gbr  -0.849  0.652  0.550  0.486  0.049  671
ger*  -0.557  0.353  0.308  0.320  0.057  918
ita  0.034  0.679  -0.380  0.528  0.082  520
usa  0.176  0.394  0.124  0.335  0.030  899
wid  -0.789  0.279  0.554  0.236  0.022  1388
39-40  fra  1.248  1.258  -1.027  0.958  0.120  278
gbr  -0.173  1.249  -0.126  0.985  0.070  327
ger#  -2.379  1.113  1.804  0.930  0.205  404
ita  -0.773  1.108  0.889  0.816  0.158  394
usa  -0.932  1.065  0.224  0.816  0.054  491
wid  -1.021  0.686  0.508  0.553  0.054  637
41-63  fra  1.231  1.132  -1.469  0.804  0.175  158
gbr  3.179  1.301  -1.326  0.880  0.129  241
ger*  1.060  0.826  -1.655  0.529  0.302  334
ita  -1.460  0.929  1.665  0.609  0.175  423
usa  -0.776  0.896  0.492  0.621  0.037  515
wvd  0.968  0.300  -1.438  0.204  0.100  1372
64-83  fra  -1.477  1.035  0.769  0.641  0.361  263
gbr  -3.218  1.117  1.873  0.750  0.112  355
gera  0.461  0.769  -0.734  0.473  0.051  653
ita  -2.616  0.495  1.713  0.387  0.229  541
usa  -2.045  0.417  0.399  0.354  0.151  615
wvd  -1.345  0.391  0.554  0.262  0.066  1331
84-865  fra  -0.675  1.004  1.173  0.598  0.077  554
gbr  -0.763  0.840  1.130  0.534  0.142  723
ger+  -0.409  0.440  0.816  0.261  0.066  1072
Ita  -0.227  0.525  0.619  0.320  0.033  1213
usa  -0.297  0.435  0.586  0.300  0.040  1129
wid  0.526  0.246  -0.394  0.167  0.020  1936
86-92  fra  1.245  0.749  0.630  0.589  0.644  98
gbr  -1.417  0.482  -0.456  0.478  0.086  146
gera  -0.040  0.599  -2.265  0.560  0.519  200
ita  0.124  0.423  0.017  0.356  0.669  244
usa  -0.068  0.395  0.409  0.386  0.078  218
wid  0.303  0.251  -0.403  0.241  0.170  446
93-96  fra  -4.085  2.327  3.440  1.276  0.709  37
gbr  2.877  1.710  -2.691  1.638  0.464  39
ger4  2.558  0.792  -0.542  1.066  0.190  86
Ita  1.265  0.584  0.198  0.872  0.452  139
usa  -1.124  0.617  0.221  0.522  0.106  141
wvd  0.452  0.411  -1.824  0.311  0.339  300
*  t  Estimates  are in bold  and standard  errors  are beside  the estimates;  all  variables  are in  natural  logs.  The countries
represented  are France  (fra),  Great  Britain  (gbr),  Germany  (ger),  Italy  (ita),  USA  (usa),  and the non-MERCOSUR
world  as an aggregate  (wid).  4  Gernany's  data  period  runs  from  1991-96.  All  others  1989-96.
51Table  4A: Estimated  coefficients  of equation  (6) over  all commodities.**
COUNTRY  (years)  X  SE  T*  SE  w/e,Q,  SE  w/e 2Q2 SE  w*le 1*Q, SE  R 2 EDF
CHILE  (91-96)  1.353 0.10  0.127 0.08  0.828  0.13  -0.895 0.17  0.091  0.13  0.89  1042
GERMANY  (91-96) 0.737 0.09  0.447 0.08  1.081 0.08  -1.280 0.17  -0.033  0.08  0.61  4959
JAPAN  (89-96)  1.071 0.09  0.168 0.07  1.083  0.03  -1.055 0.05  0.015  0.02  0.72  2764
KOREA  (89-96)  0.184 0.07  0.360 0.06  1.385 0.05  -0.073 0.12  -0.145 0.03  0.75  1372
USA  (91-96)  0.883 0.08  0.445 0.08  0.779  0.16  -0.843 0.25  0.379  0.16  0.60  5463
Table 4B: Estimated  coefficients  of equation  (6) over all commodities  with time dummies.**
COUNTRY  T  SE  l*  SE  R 2 EDF
CHILE  1.126 0.13  0.711 0.12  0.84  1039
GERMANY 0.650 0.10  0.827 0.10  0.59  4956
JAPAN  1.029 0.11  0.370 0.09  0.70  2749
KOREA  0.373 0.13  0.838 0.11  0.64  1367
USA  0.881 0.10  0.495 0.09  0.58  5460
**  Estimates  are in bold  and  standard  errors  SE  are  besides  the  estimates,  all variables  m  in natural  logs. The  parthesis  next  to the  country  is the
mnge  of the data. The  unit  values  used  here  are f.o.b.  since  we are  using  the exporters  as reporters  here.
52Table  5A: Estimated  coefficients  of equation  (6), by 9 commodity  groups.**
HS-2  T  SE  *  SE  w/eIQI  SE  wIe2Q2  SE  wI/el*QI  SE  R2 EDF  t
01-15  chl  1.384  0.22  -0.190  0.18  1.279  0.27  -1.261  0.37  -0.332  0.28  0.87  378
ger  0.231  0.33  *  -0.633  0.21  1.706  0.10  -2.224  0.13  -0.926  0.11  0.94  184
jpn  - - - - - - - - - - - 10
kor  - - - - - - - - - - - 2
usa  0.090  0.50  *  0.127  0.42  1.743  0.46  -0.531  0.61  -0.703  0.49  0.75  279
16-27  chl  0.833  0.21  0.281  0.17  *  0.945  0.32  -1.912  0.45  -0.242  0.33  0.87  181
ger  0.749  0.53  1.248  0.44  *  -1.518  0.75  2.819  1.38  2.027  0.67  0.46  160
jpn  0.033  0.40  *  0.996  0.30  *  1.456  0.16  -1.189  0.25  -0.061  0.12  0.85  66
kor  0.124  0.52  *  0.386  0.37  1.600  0.30  0.385  0.35  0.085  0.15  0.90  57
usa  0.545  0.30  0.830  0.31  4  0.121  0.85  -2.652  1.14  1.120  0.87  0.66  301
28-38  chl  3.826  0.53  -1.655  0.44  1.065  0.54  -2.902  0.78  -1.025  0.60  0.78  139
ger  0.316  0.19  *  0.283  0.17  4  0.800  0.14  -1.524  0.26  0.173  0.13  0.67  933
jpn  0.343  0.32  #  0.642  0.23  *  1.091  0.09  -1.157  0.14  -0.074  0.06  0.76  452
kor  -0.224  0.78  -0.640  0.55  1.616  0.36  0.906  0.68  -0.173  0.21  0.57  86
usa  0.762  0.23  0.639  0.22  *  0.641  0.30  -0.425  0.43  0.422  0.32  0.62  1300
39-40  chl  -0.655  2.03  2.636  1.17  4  -1.704  2.01  1.401  1.81  1.845  1.71  0.56  49
ger  0.916  0.40  0.246  0.33  0.813  0.33  -0.224  0.81  0.533  0.32  0.69  422
jpn  0.889  0.45  0.544  0.32  4  1.359  0.15  -1.338  0.25  0.109  0.10  0.69  270
kor  0.432  0.60  0.120  0.44  2.147  0.38  -1.015  0.55  -0.780  0.28  0.65  142
usa  0.354  0.39  *  0.118  0.35  2.065  0.63  -1.908  0.66  -0.610  0.62  0.76  475
41-63  chli  2.566  0.60  0.200  0.41  0.677  0.43  -0.400  0.60  0.480  0.45  0.72  152
ger  0.423  0.47  1.159  0.37  4  0.840  0.25  0.458  0.52  0.140  0.23  0.55  348
jpn  3.546  0.56  -1.084  0.40  0.459  0.15  -0.538  0.25  0.396  0.12  0.63  150
kor  -0.710  0.37  '  1.245  0.23  4  0.904  0.23  0.098  0.35  0.245  0.12  0.65  385
usa  0.757  0.42  0.607  0.32  *  0.853  0.43  0.224  0.76  0.457  0.45  0.58  633
64-83  chl  1.311  0.42  0.775  0.28  4  0.024  0.61  -0.541  0.86  0.702  0.63  0.89  78
ger  0.604  0.38  0.717  0.33  4  1.280  0.22  -2.196  0.56  -0.349  0.21  0.57  937
jpn  0.612  0.39  0.495  0.28  4  1.033  0.13  -0.899  0.19  0.036  0.09  0.54  471
kor  2.810  0.91  -0.334  0.65  1.749  0.40  -2.631  0.73  -0.432  0.24  0.55  147
usa  1.372  0.52  -0.460  0.48  0.877  0.76  -0.180  1.03  0.348  0.77  0.34  637
84-85  chl  0.900  1.88  -0.238  1.16  1.449  2.64  1.415  3.37  0.486  2.65  0.51  22
ger  0.909  0.23  0.669  0.20  *  1.122  0.19  -0.804  0.51  0.076  0.19  0.62  1579
jpn  1.148  0.22  -0.319  0.15  1.274  0.07  -1.442  0.13  -0.121  0.05  0.58  1044
kor  0.570  0.19  *  0.347  0.19  *  1.420  0.15  -0.345  0.31  -0.174  0.08  0.70  312
usa  1.177  0.38  0.629  0.37  4  0.297  0.82  -1.944  0.91  0.725  0.81  0.29  1464
86-92  chl  - - - - - - - 3
ger  1.789  0.43  -0.450  0.46  2.681  0.60  -4.461  1.54  -1.587  0.60  0.54  269
Jpn  1.362  0.32  0.559  0.20  *  0.986  0.13  -0.368  0.24  0.095  0.09  0.71  206
Kor  0.955  0.14  0.606  0.40  0.346  0.52  -1.526  0.69  -0.153  0.32  0.64  90
Usa  0.739  0.40  0.077  0.47  1.969  1.87  1.275  2.45  -0.388  1.85  0.48  183
93-96  chli  - - - - - - - - - - - I
Ger  0.669  0.77  -1.572  0.73  6.498  1.52  -13.371  3.00  -5.725  1.35  0.45  87
Jpn  2.515  0.51  -0.437  0.52  0.369  0.42  0.653  0.82  0.291  0.28  0.52  45
Kor  -0.078  0.44  *  0.094  0.36  1.244  0.43  0.844  1.43  -0.015  0.22  0.25  111
Usa  0.792  0.80  -1.126  1.06  6.903  3.97  1.749  3.75  -5.176  3.93  0.30  151
*  Estimates  are in bold  and standard  errors SE are besides the estimates;  all variables  listed  above  are in natural  logs.  To the right  of the SE
we have indicated  4 if the estimate is less than one with 95% confidence,  and 4  if the estimate on the rival's  tariff  are greater  than  zero at the
same level of confidence.  t  Missing  values are assigned only  to those  estimates  with very  small  error degrees of freedom (EDF) as shown.
53Table  5B: Estimation  with  time dummies  by  9 commodity  groups.**
HS-2  COUNTRY  T  SE  T*  SE  R 2 EDF t
01-15  chl  0.442  0.35  . 1.486  0.37  *  0.84  375
ger  0.418  0.34  #  -0.812  0.28  0.60  181
jpn  - - - - - 5
kor  - - - - - 0
usa  0.565  0.67  -0.159  0.56  0.64  276
16-27  chl  1.049  0.25  0.274  0.23  0.83  178
ger  2.044  0.72  0.227  0.62  0.49  157
jpn  -0.284  0.53  #  1.298  0.43  +  0.84  61
kor  0.074  0.67  1.068  0.54  +  0.78  52
usa  0.953  0.45  0.740  0.41  4  0.68  298
28-38  chl  3.989  0.58  -1.579  0.56  0.73  136
ger  0.358  0.22 t  0.392  0.19  #  0.65  930
jpn  0.019  0.42  #  1.139  0.34  *  0.73  447
kor  -0.660  1.12  0.376  0.81  0.42  81
usa  0.858  0.24  0.597  0.22  #  0.62  1297
39-40  chl  -0.778  2.21  2.669  1.59  #  0.59  46
ger  0.800  0.52  0.959  0.55  *  0.67  419
jpn  0.903  0.60  0.660  0.52  0.68  265
kor  0.503  0.92  0.920  0.70  0.61  137
usa  1.302  0.54  -0.743  0.55  0.76  472
41-63  chl  1.477  0.66  1.392  0.50  *  0.61  149
ger  -0.255  0.50  . 1.899  0.39  #  0.55  345
jpn  2.773  0.78  -0.474  0.58  0.60  145
kor  -0.352  0.91  1.516  0.60  *  0.58  380
usa  0.288  0.51  0.965  0.38  *  0.57  630
64-83  chl  0.726  0.71  1.524  0.60  #  0.72  75
ger  0.146  0.41  . 2.110  0.39  *  0.57  934
jpn  0.756  0.57  . 0.564  0.49  0.54  466
kor  2.843  1.31  0.287  0.89  0.47  142
usa  1.560  0.64  -0.530  0.60  0.32  634
84-85  chl  1.093  1.93  1.083  1.69  0.49  19
ger  0.919  0.27  0.968  0.32  #  0.60  1576
jpn  0.908  0.29  0.238  0.26  0.58  1039
kor  0.391  0.30  *  1.498  0.24  4  0.64  307
usa  0.915  0.43  1.107  0.45  *  0.29  1461
86-92  chl  - - - - - I
ger  2.070  0.45  0.488  0.59  0.54  266
jpn  1.556  0.31  0.309  0.27  0.66  201
kor  0.912  0.24  0.354  0.33  0.68  85
usa  0.445  0.46  0.242  0.58  0.49  180
93-96  chl  - - - - - 0
ger  1.099  0.89  -1.471  0.96  0.39  84
jpn  3.305  0.99  -0.964  0.79  0.56  40
kor  -0.334  0.52  . 0.424  0.45  0.26  106
usa  -0.420  1.04  -0.880  1.31  0.34  148
**  Estimates  are in bold  and standard  errors SE are besides the estimates;  all variables  listed  above  are in natural  logs.  To
the right of the SE  we have indicated  # if the estimate  is less than  one with  95% confidence,  and 4  if the estimate  on the
rival's  tariffs  are greater  than zero at the same level of confidence.  t  Missing  values are assigned  only  to those  estimates
with  very small  error degrees of freedom (EDF) as shown.
54Table  6A: Estimation  results of equation  (7).**
HS-2  T  SE  w*T*/e 1*Q1  SE  (w*le2*)1Q2  SE  (wiel)1Q  SE  R 2 EDF
01-15  0.378  0.230  0.887  0.444  2.926  0.642  -0.265  0.466  0.794  327
16-27  4.028  0.404  3.383  0.828  -2.215  1.353  -2.794  0.886  0.486  183
28-38  -0.581 0.336  1.883  0.507  -0.180  0.693  -0.876  0.530  0.747  495
39-40  -0.581 0.635  4.575  0.347  -0.721  0.474  -3.852  0.373  0.938  239
41-63  1.905  0.622  OA76  1.032  5.345  1.430  0.076  1.117  0.466  307
64-83  -0.745 0.503  1.363  0.871  -1.170  1.081  -0.347  0.947  0.653  275
84-85  0.226  0.552  -1.240  0.979  -0.078  1.453  1.864  1.105  0.083  583
86-92  0.413  0.270  0.043  1.342  -4.064  2.792  1.550  1.542  0.427  183
93-96  0.124  0.913  -5.429  3.202  -7.324  6.408  8.615  3.636  0.425  59
ALL  0.245  0.086  0.202  0.173  0.808  0.287  0.671  0.185  0.689  2691
* * The estimates are in bold and standard errors are besides the estimates. All variables are in natural logs.  The member tariff factor
has been rolled into the real exchange rate variable due to lack of time series in Argentina data.  The unit values used here are in
f.o.b. since we are using the exporter as the reporter.
55Table  6B: Estimation  with Time  Dummies.**
HS-2  _  SE  w*¶*/e.Q,  SE  R 2 EDF
01-15  0.383  0.224  -0.226  0.073  0.114  326
16-27  2.199  0.334  -0.396  0.075  0.797  182
28-38  -0.201  0.255  0.200  0.065  0.139  494
39-40  -0.509  0.840  0.215  0.126  0.107  238
41-63  1.811  0.568  -0.237  0.171  0.113  306
64-83  -1.305  0.434  0.173  0.122  0.104  274
84-85  0.137  0.528  -0.486  0.141  0.101  582
86-92  0.443  0.274  0.476  0.271  0.061  182
93-96  0.172  0.862  0.957  0.725  0.109  58
ALL  0.188  0.083  -0.055  0.030  0.025  2690
** The estimnates  are in bold and standard errors are besides the estimates.  All variables are in natural logs.
The unit values used here are in f.o.b. since we are using the exporters as the reporter.
56Table  7: Total  1991  Exports  to Brazil  Terms  of Trade  Losses  ($ million).**
COUNTRY  EXPORTS  TOTAL EXPORT REVENUE  LOSSES
4A  5A  4A*  5A*
CHILE  524.4  -17.3  -25.7  -40.4  -51.2
GERMANY  2,030.0  -236.0  -198.8  -169.4  -165.2
JAPAN  1,349.6  -58.8  -13.1  -70.6  -20.8
KOREA  146.7  -13.7  -19.1  1.2  -8.3
USA  5,395.5  -624.1  -690.5  -545.3  -556.8
SUM  9,446.2  -950.0  -947.2  -824.4  -802.3
** Revenue  losses  were calculated  using  the elasticities  of the rival's tariffs  from  Table  4A and 5A. 4A*
and  5A*  also  incorporates  the own  tariff  effects  due  to MEN  reductions.
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